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A Global Vaccine Injury Compensation System
individuals will experience adverse events in return for
herd immunity.
The second approach, requiring manufacturers to
pay, is based on the integrity and dignity of the individual person—those whose products cause injury
should make whole those individuals who experienced
an adverse event. These types of approaches are representative of the common approach worldwide, yet
they destabilize the effort to promote immunization by
failing fundamental tests for fairness by asking people
with few resources to pay for serious (if rare) injuries
with the first approach vs introducing economic uncertainty with the second.
The third approach, a no-fault compensation system for adverse events attributed to vaccination, balances these competing principles. Under a no-fault
vaccine injury compensation system, governments compensate individuals who are harmed by properly manufactured vaccines instead of requiring them to use legal
or other processes against manufacturers. A no-fault
system acknowledges that a community that promotes immunization, knowing individuals will be injured, must share the burden of the cost of injuries. This
approach also acknowledges that manufacturers are a critical part of vaccine acThere is a strong public health justification
cess and that they must have a basic level
of economic certainty. It fulfills the utilifor a system that compensates those
tarian and communitarian expectations
who experience vaccine injury, especially
of a democratic society. Yet no-fault comwhen the system is supported by all
pensation systems for vaccine injury prevail in only 19 jurisdictions worldwide inresponsible parties.
cluding the United States.5
prioritized vaccine injury liability when considering
A global vaccine injury compensation system to
whether promising Ebola vaccine candidates, which bring economic certainty would represent a substanincorporated technologies unused in any licensed vac- tial advance to this critical component of the global pubcine worldwide, might be used to address the out- lic health system and build trust necessary for vaccines—
break. Because the teratogenic effects of Zika virus especially in emergency contexts. Such a system would
may occur at all stages of pregnancy, candidate Zika address barriers to vaccine manufacturers’ participavaccines would be most beneficial if administered prior tion as well as perceptions that contribute to vaccine
to or during pregnancy—the condition most likely to hesitancy in low-resource countries. A prominent peraffect both research and immunization because of ception shared by persons in low-resource settings is that
liability concerns.4
diseases with pandemic potential that affect the global
There are 3 types of approaches to addressing vac- poor are neglected by the world’s major medical recine injury: patients with adverse events may bear the search institutions. When one of those diseases threatcosts associated with their injuries; they may seek com- ens Europe or North America, those institutions and their
pensation through litigation against private-sector ac- sponsoring governments invest in relevant medical retors (principally manufacturers); or they may seek com- search but do so using the global poor as relatively unpensation from publicly supported systems that draw protected human research subjects.6 A global vaccine
from public-sector and private-sector contributions. injury compensation system may reduce the hesitancy
Each type of approach is supported by an ethical ratio- among those making the decision to receive a candinale. The first approach, requiring individuals with vac- date vaccine with a limited safety profile.
cine injury to bear their own costs, is an extreme utiliThe ethical and policy rationales behind no-fault
tarian version of the fundamental social contract compensation systems for adverse events attributable
supporting immunization. The benefits of vaccination so to vaccination are clear. Principles of fairness justify
outweigh the risks that communities accept that some compensation to those who are injured and remedy

Vaccines are extremely safe and harm is rare. Worldwide, more than 30 000 vaccine doses are delivered per
second through routine immunization programs, which,
in turn, prevent an estimated 2 million to 3 million deaths
annually.1 The occurrence of serious adverse events, such
as those that result in death, threaten life, require inpatient hospitalization, or result in significant disability, are
rare (eg, <1 adverse event occurs per 10 million doses for
tetanus toxoid vaccines, 1-2 adverse events per 1 million doses for inactivated influenza vaccine, and none for
hepatitis A).2
Yet the specter of vaccine injury plays a central role
in vaccine access and will continue to do so as vaccine
technologies evolve. The public health emergencies
involving influenza A(H1N1), Ebola, and Zika illustrate
the relationship between vaccine access and vaccine
injury. An H1N1-specific vaccine was developed within 4
months of the virus being isolated by the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, but the demands of
vaccine manufacturers and donating governments for
comprehensive release of liability delayed distribution
of vaccines to low-resource countries by at least 5
months.3 Governments and international organizations
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inequities that inhere in litigation, and few who are injured have the
resources to formally complain to administrative or judicial authorities. Moreover, the overwhelming consensus in the public health
literature suggests that no-fault compensation systems increase
public confidence in vaccination.7
Some examples under international law may inform such a system. It begins with an agreement recognizing the overwhelming, evidence-based consensus that community-wide immunization provides an immense public health benefit and that the benefit should
not accrue to the uninjured at the expense of the injured.8 There is
precedent for such a fairness-oriented public health agreement.
The 2011 World Health Organization (WHO) Pandemic Influenza
Preparedness Framework9 allows vaccine manufacturers to access
biological materials from the Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System in return for donated or discounted contributions of
resulting vaccines. Manufacturers also contribute toward the cost
of running the facility.
Once the agreement is formed, member states could borrow
the principle of complementarity from other international legal
regimes. Under complementary systems, states agree to either
manage the subject matter of the agreement internally or participate in a regional or international system of administration. In the
vaccine context, states would agree to establish their own national
systems for no-fault compensation or agree to participate in a
regional or a WHO-administered scheme accomplishing the same
objective. Models exist for national implementation even in lowresource settings. For example, the WHO already provides assistance to many national technical immunization advisory groups
and may have a primary role in developing adverse event and comARTICLE INFORMATION
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pensation tables analogously to the US Department of Health and
Human Services’ Health Resources and Services Administration. In
New Zealand, vaccine injury is under the same administrative
authority as other injuries caused by accident (ie, unintentional
events); the program may be a model for low-resource countries in
which worker compensation claims systems are more developed.
Several policy options for funding and eligibility and administration for WHO, regional, and national systems are shown in the
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There is a strong public health justification for a system that compensates those who experience vaccine injury, especially when the
system is supported by all responsible parties (governments that
compel immunization and manufacturers that produce the vaccines). Establishing a global compensation system could build confidence in the processes that lead to the development of vaccines
deployed in low-resource settings, relieve vaccine manufacturers of
liability concerns that impede vaccine investments, and facilitate effective responses to global public health threats like Ebola and Zika.
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